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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801,
63G-4-403, and 78-4-103(2)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Where Ms. Christensen's cumulative work exertions over 12 hour shifts,
using tools weighing up to 70 pounds, over the course of four months and culminated in
injury on November 20, 2001, whether the Labor Commission acted reasonably and
rationally when it ruled that Ms. Christensen was injured by cumulative trauma accident.
Standard of Review:
This Court should review for reasonableness. The Legislature granted the
Commission discretion to determine the facts and apply the law. Utah Code Ann. § 34A1-301. Reviewing courts "grant the Commission a measure of discretion when applying
the legal standard to a given set of facts." Drake v. Indus. Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182
(Utah 1997). When the Legislature has granted an agency discretion to determine an
issue, the agency's action is reviewed for reasonableness. AE Clevite, Inc. v. Labor
Comm % 2000 UT App 35 \ 7, 996 P.2d 1072, 1074, cert, denied, 4 p.3d 1289 (Utah
2000). Courts also resolve "any doubt respecting the right of compensation in favor of
the injured employee." Drake, 939 P.2d at 182.

vi

In AE Clevite, this Court reviewed the Commission's determination that an
employee sustained injuries in the course of his employment. The facts were undisputed:
Mr.Tjas was at his home office, salting his icy driveway in anticipation of a work-related
package delivery, when he slipped, fell, and sustained severe spinal injuries. The
Commission ruled that his injuries arose from his employment. On appeal, AE Clevite
argued that the injuries were not sustained in the course of his employment, or arose out
of his employment. Id. at ^ 8, 1074-5 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401). This Court
affirmed the Commission's ruling under an abuse of discretion standard, and held that
"the Commission did not err in ruling" that the injury arose from Mr. Tjas' employment.
Id. at U 13, 1077.
Similarly, this Court should review for reasonableness because in Ms.
Christensen's case, the appeal arose from the same Commission applying the same statute
as the AE Clevite case.1 In that case, the facts were not in dispute. Similarly, Smith's did
not dispute the facts of Ms. Christensen's exertions; only whether those facts stated an
accident claim.2 Brief at 16. This Court should uphold the Commission's determination
1

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 ("by accident arising out of and in the course
of the employee's employment"). In AE Clevite, this Court reviewed for reasonableness
the Commission's findings and application of the law as to "arising out of and in the
course employment." This Court should review for reasonableness the Commission's
findings and application of law as to determine whether Ms. Christensen's facts showed
she was injured "by accident."
2

See discussion infra, Part I.
vii

unless it exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. AE Clevite, 2000 UT App
att7,996P.2datl074.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401:
(1)

An employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employee's employment... shall be paid . . . compensation
for loss sustained on account of the injury . . . the amount provide in this
chapter for medical, nurse and hospital services and medicines
STATEMENT OF CASE

This case is about a cumulative trauma accident case that was plead and proven
before the administrative law judge, and upheld by the Labor Commission. Ms.
Christensen initially plead an occupational disease claim, then dismissed the claim at the
hearing, without objection by Smith's. Ms. Christensen presented evidence on two
accident claims to the Commission, including a cumulative trauma accident. After the
Commission found she had been injured "by accident," Smith's sought to recast Ms.
Christensen9s claim as an occupational disease claim, under a different statute, with
different requirements, and a lesser remedy. This appeal is about: 1) whether Ms.
Christensen's repetitive work exertions with tools weighing as much as 70 pounds, during
12 hour shifts over a four month period, were both the legal and medical cause of her
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injuries; 2) whether Smith's must remain liable for accident compensation because it
identified no error in either the Commission's legal or its medical cause analysis, and
remains liable for Ms. Christensen's accident; and, 3) whether Ms. Christensen had the
right to choose her cause of action for cumulative trauma accident, or if instead, the
Commission can and must convert her accident to another cause of action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ms. Christensen has worked for Smith's Food & Drug (Smith's) since 1993. She
has worked in various positions, including as a cheese cook, making cottage cheese in
large industrial vats.
Ms. Christensen was diagnosed with cervical injury on November 20, 2001, and
required cervical fusion surgery from C4 to C7 to treat multiple large disc herniations. R.
12. Ms. Christensen filed alternative claims for compensation. She filed three claims:
Two accident claims (one for cumulative trauma for 11/20/01, R. 23, and another for
2/1/01 date of injury, R. 2) and an occupational disease claim. R. 35. At her hearing, she
withdrew her occupational disease claim, and Smith's did not object. R. 88. Ms.
Christensen presented two alternative accident claims to the administrative law judge for
decision.
At her hearing, Ms. Christensen presented medical evidence in support of both
accidents, including a statement from her treating surgeon, who opined that her work at
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Smith's, and particularly, her work as a cheese cook, resulted in injury on 11/20/01. R.
12.
Ms. Christensen also testified as to her accidents at Smith's. She testified as to her
fall on 2/1/01, where she struck the back of her neck against a metal box. R. 174. She
also testified about her duties as a cheese cook, which led to her injury on November 20,
2001, including, inter alia: lifting stainless steel screens with wire (length-wise cutters) to
attach to an overhead mechanism over the vats; attaching a cross cut knife to an overhead
mechanism, which she would push and pull, back and forth across the vat at shoulder
height for the entire length of the vat, about 8 times per vat; pulling knives out of the vat;
inserting a 6 foot heater into the vat (5-10 pounds); inserting 6 foot stainless steel paddles
(50-60 pounds) into an overhead mechanism above the vat at shoulder level with arms
outstretched, commonly requiring multiple efforts; removing the 6 foot paddles and
placing them in the next vat, for the same process; attaching 2 pushers (65-70 pounds) to
the same overhead mechanism used for the paddles, and using the same movements to
attach as the paddles; cleaning the vats by reaching over the sides and scrubbing the
bottom and sides with brush attached to a 5 to 6 foot long handle; and, rinsing the vat.
There were 8 vats in the room, so there were never empty vats; she was constantly
working during her shift. Ms. Christensen worked 12 hour shifts, with breaks that totaled
between one hour to one hour and fifteen minutes. Ms. Christensen performed the
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foregoing repetitive tasks for about 10.75 to 11 hours per shift. R. 134, 176 - 84. Ms.
Christensen performed these shifts from August, 2001 until her cervical injury was
diagnosed on November 20, 2001. R. 135, 176 - 84.
Petitioner also testified that about 3-4 months before November 2001, she had
experienced shoulder pain that was exacerbated by work, but it had always resolved. But
in November 2001, she testified that she experienced a different type of pain and stiffness
in her shoulder than before, and that on approximately November 10, 2001, she
experienced constant wrist, elbow and shoulder pain. R. 134-5, 184-5.
On June 2, 2004, the judge issued herfindingsof fact and interim order. R. 59-65.
On June 24, 2004, the judge referred the medical aspects of the case to a medical
panel. R. 67-8.
On February 23, 2005, the panel issued its report. The report stated that there was
a medical causal connection between Ms. Christensen's cumulative trauma accident of
November 20, 2001, and her cervical injuries. The panel was asked whether the medical
care was necessitated by the cumulative trauma accident. Instead of answering yes/no,
the panel apportioned permanent impairment and the need for medical care 60/40
between non-industrial and industrial causes, as if Ms. Christensen's claim were for
occupational disease. R. 72-3.
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On March 18, 2005, Ms. Christensen filed objections to the medical panel report.
R. 77 - 84.
On March 31, 2005, Smith's filed a response to Ms. Christensen's objections. R.
95-113.
On August 31, 2005, the judge requested the panel supplement its report. The
judge explained that cumulative trauma accidents were accident claims, and not
occupational disease claims, and further, that it was inappropriate for the panel to
apportion Ms. Christensen's claim as if it were for occupational disease. R. 115.
On September 8, 2005, the panel issued its supplemental report. R. 118-9.
On September 23, 2005, Smith's objected to the supplemental report. 120-1.
On November 7, 2005, Ms. Christensen responded to Smith's objection to the
supplemental report. R. 122-3.
On December 29, 2005, the judge requested the panel again supplement its report.
R. 124.
On January 10, 2005, the panel supplemented its report, explaining that the acute
herniations seen at the time of surgery lead to the conclusion that Ms. Christensen's
cervical injuries were best explained by an acute event; the November 2001 accident. It
also opined that all of her permanent impairment was attributable to the November 20,
2001 accident. R. 127.

xii

On June 29, 2006, the judge issued her findings of fact, conclusions of law and
order. The judge found that the November 20, 2001 cumulative trauma accident was the
legal and medical cause of her cervical injuries, and ordered Smith's to pay appropriate
compensation and medical treatment expenses. R. 131 - 45.
On July 26, 2006, Smith's filed its Motion for Review. Smith's did not appeal the
facts of Ms. Christensen's accident. Nor did it appeal whether the accident was the legal
cause or medical cause of her injuries. Instead it argued that: (1) Ms. Christensen's claim
was for occupational disease, and not accident; and, (2) that her cumulative trauma claim
should be dismissed because her pre-existing conditions contributed to her injuries. R.
146 - 196. Smith's abandoned this second argument in the present appeal.
On March 16, 2009, the Commission issued its Order Affirming ALJ's Decision.
This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the Commission's order awarding compensation by
cumulative trauma accident. Ms. Christensen was injured "by accident" because her
repetitive work exertions with tools weighing up to 70 pounds, during twelve hour shifts
over a four month period, were the legal and medical cause of her injuries. Smith's did
not appeal the Commission's determination on legal or medical cause, and identified no
particular error in either analysis. Instead, it simply argued that there was no accident,
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and that Ms. Christensen's claim was for occupational disease. Smith's would recast Ms.
Christensen's claim as occupational disease, so that it need only pay a percentage of her
compensation. But Ms. Christensen chose to present her cumulative trauma accident
claim to the Commission, and was awarded full compensation for her accident. Courts
can not convert causes of action, and the Commission could not convert Ms.
Christensen's accident claim to occupational disease, even if it were so inclined. This
Court should affirm the Commission's order, and hold that Ms. Christensen's repetitive
work exertions with tools weighing up to 70 pounds, during twelve hour shifts over a four
month period, were the legal and medical cause of her injuries

xiv

ARGUMENT
I.

MS. CHRISTENSEN WAS INJURED "BY ACCIDENT" BECAUSE HER
REPETITIVE WORK EXERTIONS WITH TOOLS WEIGHING UP TO 70
POUNDS, DURING 12 HOUR SHIFTS OVER A FOUR MONTH PERIOD,
WERE THE LEGAL AND MEDICAL CAUSE OF HER INJURIES.
Ms. Christensen was injured in a cumulative trauma accident. Smith's brief

ignored cumulative trauma theories of industrial accident, even though that was Ms.
Christensen's theory of recovery, and the basis for the Commission's award. Instead, it
argued that there was no accident because "There was no sudden, unexpected or
unintended occurrence that either caused or resulted in an injury to Ms. Christensen's
cervical spine in November 2001."3 Brief at 20 (emphasis added). But "accidents" have

3

Smith's brief misstated an important distinction. The Supreme Court
explained that "accidents" include unintended "occurrences," and may be either the cause
of the injury or the injury itself. But Smith's brief represented that the unintended
"occurrence" could only mean the cause of the injury. Brief at 20. This misstatement of
law was essential to its argument: "There was no sudden, unexpected or unintended
occurrence that either caused or resulted in an injury to Ms. Christensen's cervical spine
in November 2001." Brief at 20 (emphasis added). Because the cause of Ms.
Christensen's injuries did not occur entirely in November, 2001, went the argument, her
claim was not an accident. Id. This was misleading, and contrary to Utah law. The Utah
Supreme Court explained that "[WJhere either the cause of the injury or the result of an
exertion was different from what would normally be expected to occur, the occurrence
was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore 'by accident.'" Allen 729 P.2d at
22
The inclusion of "unexpected cause OR unexpected result of the exertion" is an
important for cumulative trauma accidents. The purpose of allowing cumulative trauma
accidents is to appropriately account for exertions, which in isolation, may not cause
injury, but when combined, may amount to unusual or extraordinary wear and tear when
compared to typical non-employment life. The "unexpected result" is the essence of
cumulative trauma accidents: the injury (unexpected result) may not be expected from a
single isolated exertion, but can be easily understood when combined with other isolated

never been restricted to a single, discrete exertion, and Utah appellate courts have upheld
cumulative accidents that occurred over the course of several days or months. This Court
should affirm the Commission's decision because Ms. Christensen's cumulative repetitive
exertions over four months were the medical and legal cause of her injuries.
A.

Utah Courts Have Never Limited Accident Claims To Single Exertion
Injuries.

Long before it decided Allen v, Labor Commfn, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986),4 the
Utah Supreme Court recognized cumulative trauma theories of industrial accident. Over
twenty years before it decided the Allen case, the Court explained that accidents are
not necessarily restricted to some single incident which
happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or other
repetitive cause, a climax might be reached in such manner as
to properly fall within the definition of an accident

exertions for the purpose of determining legal cause.
Smith's argument should fail because this Court is bound to uphold decades of
Supreme Court precedent allowing cumulative trauma accidents. If accidents can occur
from multiple exertions, those exertions necessarily occur at separate times; not a single
place and time. Smith's argument that there was no accident because there was "no
occurrence that caused or [injured] Ms. Christensen's cervical spine in November, 2001,"
Brief at 20, fails because accidents may encompass repetitive exertions over different
times. Put another way, Ms. Christensen's repetitive exertions during 12 hour shifts over
four months stated a claim for industrial accident. This Court should follow well-settled
Utah law, and affirm the Commission's order that found Ms. Christensen was injured by
cumulative trauma accident.
4

The Allen decision set forth the dual requirements of every accident: legal and
medical cause. See discussion infra, Part II.
2

Carting v. Indus. Comm % 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 205 (1965).
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly upheld industrial accident claims under
cumulative or repetitive trauma theories. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(Utah 1981) (cumulative trauma where employee "scal[ed] rock from the roof of the mine
and shoveling it onto a conveyor belt"); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 P.2d 508 (1980)
(cumulative trauma where reaching to shovel under a conveyor belt, and pop in the back);
Miera v. Indus. Comm % 728 P.2d 1023, 1024, (Utah 1986) (repetitive jumps into eight foot hole at thirty-minute intervals was legal cause of injury); Nyrehn v. Indus. Comm %
800 P.2d 330 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (cumulative trauma where lifting tubs of merchandise
weighing between fifteen and forty pounds, thirty to thirty-six times a day, over two and a
half months); Stouffer Foods v. Indus. Comm % 801 P.2d 179, (Utah App 1990)
(cumulative trauma where repetitively or continuously gripping high pressure water hoses
for up to eight hours). Utah courts have broadly interpreted the term "accident,"
consistent with the Act's purpose to pay benefits to injured employees.
R.

Exertions Are Determinative In Accident Cases.

Smith's argument ignored well-settled Utah law because cumulative trauma claims
combine several exertions into a single exertion. "Exertion" for the purpose of proving
legal causation, is the "aggregate exertion of the repetitive exertions that establish the
accident." Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 336 (citing Miera with approval). In Nyrehn, this Court

3

found that it was "unquestionable" that two and a half months of lifting tubs of
merchandise 30 to 35 times a day would cause unusual and extraordinary wear and tear
on a body when compared to usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Ms. Christensen's exertions involved
greater weights and were more rigorous than in the Nyrehn case, and occurred over a
similar time period (almost three months for Ms. Nyrehn; four months for Ms.
Christensen). It did not matter that Ms. Christensen's exertions occurred over four
months, instead of a single incident. Instead, the exertions - not their duration - determine
whether an employees' activities amount to an "accident," as suggested by Smith's.5
5

Ms. Christensen's position squares with common sense because it
recognizes the significance of exertions in accident cases. For example: Assume two
employees regularly lifted 70 pound boxes at work, and that they had performed the same
job for several years. Over the course of 3-4 months, assume that the first employee
began to experience discrete back pain at work when lifting the boxes, and finally, one
day following his shift, he experienced new and different intractable pain in the same area
of his low back. Assume that the second employee injured his back one day while lifting
a single 70 pound box. Assume that both employees were diagnosed with the same type
of low back injury as a result of their respective work activities.
Under Ms. Christensen's position, both employees could bring an accident claims
because lifting 70 pound boxes exceeds normal non-employment exertions. But under
Smith's argument, the first employee could only bring an occupational disease claim
because his exertions had occurred over a period of months, while the second employee
could bring an accident claim, because he injured his back from a single lift. In other
words, even though they both injured their backs from lifting 70 pound boxes, the first
employee's remedy would be significantly diminished solely because he was not injured
from a single lifting episode. The first employee would only be entitled to a percentage
of his medical treatment and wage loss benefit his back injury occurred over 3-4 months
of lifting 70 pound boxes, while the second employee would receive 100% of his medical
treatment and wage loss benefit because his injury occurred from a single lifting episode.
4

Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. Contrary to Smith's position, all other things being equal, exertions
that occur over a longer duration provide for a greater possible combined exertion,
making legal cause (presumably) easier to demonstrate. Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 336.
Smith's brief ignored Ms. Christensen's exertions, but they were determinative in her
accident claim.
C.

Ms. Christensen's Work Activities Over Four Months Were The Legal
Cause Of Her Injuries.

The undisputed facts show that Ms. Christensen's exertions over four months were
the legal cause of her injury because they were above and beyond those encountered in
typical non-employment life. The judge found that Ms. Christensen's degenerative
condition contributed to her cervical injuries, and so applied the heightened Allen
standard for legal causation. R. 138-9. Ms. Christensen testified as to her specific work
activities as a cheese cook, making cottage cheese in industrial vats that were 4.5 feet
high and 25 to 40 feet long. All work in the vat (except to clean it) was done at
approximately shoulder height or higher, owing to the height of the vat.

Under Smith's argument, if Ms. Christensen had injured herself by lifting a single
70 pound paddle, she could bring an accident claim. But because she was injured from
repeatedly lifting 70 pound paddles (among other things), Smith's argues she could not
state a claim for accident. Put another way, Smith's interpretation of the law defies
common sense and the law: It ignores the nature of employees' exertions, and only
considers their duration. This Court should reject Smith's argument as both contrary to
settled law and common sense.
5

Ms. Christensen testified that her activities included, inter alia: lifting stainless
steel screens with wire (length-wise cutters) to attach to an overhead mechanism over the
vats; attaching a cross cut knife to an overhead mechanism, which she would push and
pull, back and forth across the vat at shoulder height for the entire length of the vat, about
8 times per vat; pulling knives out of the vat; inserting 6 foot heater into the vat (5-10
pounds); inserting 6 foot stainless steel paddles(50-60 pounds) into an overhead
mechanism above the vat at shoulder level with arms outstretched, commonly requiring
multiple efforts; removing the 6 foot paddles and placing them in the next vat, for the
same process; attaching 2 pushers (65-70 pounds) to the same mechanism used for the
paddles, and using the same movements to attach as the paddles; cleaning the vats by
reaching over the sides and scrubbing the bottom and sides with brush attached to a 5 to 6
foot long handle; and, rinsing the vat. There were 8 vats in the room, so there were never
empty vats. Petitioner worked 12 hour shifts, with breaks that totaled between one hour
to one hour and fifteen minutes. R. 134. In other words, Ms. Christensen performed the
foregoing repetitive tasks for about 10.75 to 11 hours per shift. Ms. Christensen
performed these shifts from August, 2001 until her cervical injury was diagnosed on
November 20, 2001. R. 135.
Petitioner also testified that about 3-4 months before November 2001, she had
experienced shoulder pain that was exacerbated by work, but it had always resolved. But
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in November 2001, she testified that she experienced a different type of pain and stiffness
in her shoulder than before, and that on approximately November 10, 2001, she
experienced constant wrist, elbow and shoulder pain. R. 134-5. Ms. Christensen was
diagnosed with cervical injury on November 20, 2001.
The ALJ cited the Nyrehn case in support of her conclusion that Petitioner's
aggregate exertions during 12 hour shifts, over approximately four months, of repetitive
lifting, connecting, pushing/pulling and cleaning either overhead or back and forth at
shoulder height, and repetitively lifting overhead tools weighing up to 70 pounds,
exceeded typical nonemployment life activities identified in the Allen case. R. 139. Ms.
Christensen proved that her work activities were the legal cause of her neck injuries.
But Smith's brief was completely silent on legal cause. It did not even cite the
Nyrehn case, even though the ALJ relied on it to award benefits. This Court should
affirm the Commission's award of benefits to Ms. Christensen, and should hold that Ms.
Christensen's facts satisfied the heightened Allen standard for legal causation, because
they exceeded typical non-employment exertions.
IX

Ms. Christensen's Work Activities Over Four Months Were The Medical
Cause Of Her Injuries.

Ms. Christensen also proved that her exertions were the medical cause of her
injuries. The medical panel found a medical causal connection between her work
activities and her injuries. R. 139. The panel may have been confused because it tried to
7

apportion Ms. Christensen's benefits as if she had tried an occupational disease claim.
But the ALJ remedied the panel error, and awarded Ms. Christensen compensation and
medical treatment expenses without apportionment, pursuant to settled Utah law.
Smith's brief argued that it was appropriate for the medical panel to apportion Ms.
Christensen's the medical cause of her cervical injuries - under the Utah Occupational
Disease Act. Brief at 22. Smith's argument was the tail wagging the dog: The panel
erred,6 but according to Smith's, the medical panel's errant response should dictate the
outcome of this case. No occupational disease claim was before the Commission,7 so it
was inappropriate for the panel to treat her claim as an occupational disease claim. The
Commission affirmed that Ms. Christensen's "benefits [were] appropriately awarded
under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act" because it was an accident claim, and that
"there [was] no need to address whether apportionment might be appropriate^ under the
Occupational Disease Act." R. 209.
The ALJ found that the cumulative trauma accident was the legal and medical
cause of Ms. Christensen's injuries. Accordingly, the ALJ ordered Smith's to pay all
temporary total disability compensation and all related medical treatment expenses, along

6

R. 72-3. Ms. Christensen identified the error, R. 77 - 84, and the judge
instructed the panel to correct its error. R. 115.
7

Smith's did not object to Ms. Christensen's withdrawal of her occupational
disease claim at the hearing. R. 3.
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with apportioned permanent partial disability. Id. at 13. This Court should affirm
because Ms. Christensen proved that the industrial accident was both the legal and
medical cause of her injuries.
II.

SMITH'S APPEAL MUST FAIL BECAUSE MS. CHRISTENSEN WAS
INJURED IN A CUMULATIVE TRAUMA ACCIDENT, AND SMITH'S
IDENTIFIED NO ERROR AS TO LEGAL OR MEDICAL CAUSE,
THEREFORE, SMITH'S REMAINS LIABLE FOR MS. CHRISTENSEN'S
ACCIDENT.
Smith's remains liable for Petitioner's industrial accident claim, because it failed

to identify any particular error as to legal or medical cause - the dual elements of every
industrial accident. Employers are liable to pay compensation and benefits to employees
who are injured "by accident." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-401. While the Act has never
defined "accident," the case law sets forth the elements of an industrial accident. Under
the seminal case of Allen v. Labor Comm 'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme
Court set forth the dual requirements for industrial accidents under Utah law. Employees
must prove that the accident was the "legal cause" of their injury: that their exertions
legally satisfy the test of "arising out of the employment." Id. at 25. Employees must
also prove "medical cause": that the injury "was medically the result of an exertion or
injury that occurred during a work-related activity." Id. at 27. Every industrial accident
case since Allen has determined compensability based on the two part test of legal and
medical causation. Smith's is liable for Ms. Christensen's accident claim because it
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identified no error as to the legal or medical cause of her injuries.
Smith's brief identified no specific error in either the Commission's legal cause or
medical cause analysis. Smith's brief tried to have it both ways: on one hand, it identified
no specific error in the Commission's findings as to the essential elements of the accident
(legal cause, medical cause); on the other hand, it baldly presumed that the Commission
was wrong and there was no accident. Brief at 16. In other words, Smith's appeal
amounted to second-guessing Ms. Christensen's cause of action without demonstrating
error in either element of her accident claim. But Smith's can not make the
Commission's findings go away by ignoring them. Having failed to demonstrate any
error as to the essential elements of Ms. Christensen's claim, Smith's appeal can not
disturb the Commission's finding that Ms. Christensen was injured in an industrial
accident. This Court should deny Smith's appeal, and affirm the Commission's finding
that Ms. Christensen was injured in a cumulative trauma accident.
This Court should sustain the facts because Smith's brief urged this court to
reweigh the evidence without appealing the facts. The brief baldly argued that "Ms.
Christensen did not sustain an accident at work," and then spent considerable energy
reviewing only the facts that supported its argument that Ms. Christensen suffered an
occupational disease claim. Brief at 16 - 19. But having failed to appeal any of the facts,
this was an attempt to impermissibly "reweigh the Commission's factual determination
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under the guise of reviewing the application of facts to the law." Martinez v. MediaPaymaster, 2007 UT 42, % 10. It was improper to try to "reweigh the Commission's
factual determinations" that Ms. Christensen's accident was the legal cause and the
medical cause of her injuries, where no particular factual findings were appealed.
Even if Smith's had appealed the facts, its appeal should be denied because its
brief did not marshal the evidence, and therefore failed to identify any fatal factual error.
To successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the appealing party must marshal
"all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts,
and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm % 776 P.2d
63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). But the brief contained no discussion of the facts that
supported the Order, and therefore, failed to "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence."
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
This Court should deny Smith's claims because it failed to identify any error in the
Commission's legal cause or medical cause findings. The brief failed to marshal the
evidence, and identified no fatal evidentiary flaw. Instead, Smith's brief reweighed the
evidence under the guise of applying the facts to the law. This Court should affirm the
Commission's order in favor of Ms. Christensen.
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III.

SMITH'S APPEAL MUST FAIL BECAUSE THE LABOR COMMISSION
COULD NOT CONVERT INDUSTRIAL MS. CHRISTENSEN'S
ACCIDENT CLAIM TO AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIM.
This Court should affirm Ms. Christensen's award of benefits because she proved

her accident claim, and there was no legal basis to convert her industrial accident claim to
an occupational disease claim. This section shows that industrial accident claims are not
identical to occupational disease claims, and provide different remedies to injured
workers, and are not interchangeable. This section also demonstrates that there was no
legal basis to convert one claim to another claim, even if the Commission were so
inclined. Finally, this section reviews settled case law that bars the Commission from
changing even a theory of recovery in an accident case, let alone converting one cause of
action to a different cause of action with different remedies.
A.

Industrial Accident Claims Are Not Identical to Occupational Disease
Claims, Provide Different Remedies, And Are Not Interchangeable.

Accident claims and occupational disease claims are not interchangeable because
they are different claims with different requirements, and different remedies. Accident
claims arise under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101,
et.seq., while occupational disease claims arise under the Utah Occupational Disease Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-101, et. seq. The requirements to prove accident claims are
different from proving occupational disease claims. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 34A-212

401 (elements of industrial accident) with Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103 (elements of
occupational disease). The biggest difference is that occupational disease claims require
only medical proof of an injurious exposure that injured the employee. Utah Code Ann. §
34A-3-110. Industrial accidents, in contrast, require proof of BOTH medical cause AND
legal cause8 to demonstrate a compensable injury. All other things equal, accidents are
harder to prove because there is an additional crucial element to prove: specific exertions
that were the legal cause of the injury.
Accident claims also provide a greater remedy for injured workers. Industrial
accident claims typically pay more compensation because weekly benefits are paid in full.
In contrast, under occupational disease claims, all benefits - weekly compensation and
medical treatment expenses - are apportioned. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110. Obviously,
occupational disease claims are typically much less expensive for employers and insurers
than accident claims. The employee's choice of remedy dictates both the evidentiary
burden, and the amount of benefits payable for the work injuries. Accident claims and
occupational disease claims are very different claims, and are not interchangeable.
In this case, Ms. Christensen filed an industrial accident claim, proved her case,
and the Commission ordered Smith's to pay benefits and compensation commensurate
8

Legal cause analysis looks at non-medical facts, specifically exertions, for
the purpose of determining whether pre-existing conditions or the subject accident was
the legal cause of the injury (akin to proximate cause analysis in torts). See discussion,
infra, Parts I and II.
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with accidents. R. 131-45. Smith's appeal seeks to retroactively convert Ms.
Christensen's accident claim to an occupational disease so that it can pay her only a
fraction of her compensation and medical treatment expenses. But there was no legal
basis to convert her claims, and this Court should deny Smith's appeal.
B.

The Labor Commission Can Not Convert Accident Claims to Occupational
Disease Claims.

Petitioner's industrial accident claim can not be converted into an occupational
disease claim. Yet the premise of Smith's appeal is that it can and should have been so
converted, and further, that it was legal error to not convert it. This section shows that
there was no legal basis for the Commission to convert Ms. Christensen's cause of action.
To the contrary, the Commission is barred from even changing the employee's theory of
recovery under the same cause of action, let alone converting it to a different cause of
action. This Court should deny Smith's appeal because there was no legal basis to
convert Ms. Christensen's accident claim into an occupational disease claim.
L

There Was No Legal Basis For Smith's Appeal.

This Court should deny Smith's appeal because there was no legal basis to
involuntarily convert an adjudicated accident claim to an occupational disease. Utah law
created workplace injury claims as a remedy for injured employees. Employees - not the
employer or the Commission - may choose one cause of action, or another, or both as
alternative claims. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417. When Smith's brief argued that Ms.
14

Christensen's accident "should be reclassified" as an occupational disease, Brief at 25, it
presumed that Smith's or the Labor Commission had the legal authority to convert her
cause of action. But there was no legal authority for Smith's premise. The brief cited no
statute or rule that would permit the Commission to convert or change Petitioner's theory
of recovery for her work injuries.9 To the contrary, courts do not decide what causes of
action to bring for parties; instead, they take evidence, and decide if a party did, or did
not, prove a party's chosen cause of action. This Court should deny Smith's appeal
because there was no authority for its argument.
2.

The Commission Can Not Even Change An Employee ys Theory Of
Recovery Within The Same Cause Of Action, Therefore, The
Commission Can Not Change An Employee's Cause of Action.

Smith's ignored well-settled law that barred the Commission from changing even
the employee's theory of recovery under the same cause of action. In the case of Hilton
Hotel v. Indus. Comm % 897 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995), this Court struck down a
Commission order where the judge sua sponte changed the employee's theory of
recovery. In that case, the employee lifted a tub of dishes when she felt low back pain.
Later, she lifted a tray of meals up onto her left shoulder, and felt pain in her back. She
filed an industrial accident claim, based only on the single tray-lifting episode. The

9

Ms. Christensen is not aware of any area of law where a defendant or court
can involuntarily convert a plaintiffs proven cause of action into a different cause of
action, with different requirements, and a different remedy.
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Commission awarded her compensation based on the "repetitious lifting of losided serving
trays," (quoting Nyrehn v. Indus. Comm % 800 P.2d at 336). In other words, the
Commission found that Petitioner had been injured by accident, but by cumulative
trauma, instead of a single lifting episode as Petitioner had alleged.
Hilton appealed, and claimed that a cumulative trauma theory of industrial
accident was never briefed or raised as a theory of recovery, and was thereby prevented
from presenting evidence to rebut the Commission's conclusions. This Court agreed and
reversed: "Because cumulative trauma was not an expressed or implied theory presented
by [the employee], she waived the right to advance that claim. Therefore, the
Commission's decision regarding this issue was outside the issues presented for
adjudication and is a nullity." Id. at 356. Under Hilton, the Commission was barred from
changing the employees' theory of recovery from a single lifting episode to a cumulative
trauma theory, even though they were both industrial accident theories.
This Court has repeatedly ruled that judges can not change the theory of recovery,
even under the same cause of action for industrial accident. Acosta v. Labor Commission,
2002 UT App 67,44 P.3d 819 (affirming Commission's reversal of award, where
employee plead single lifting episode, and ALJ awarded based on cumulative trauma
theory of accident). Put simply, the Commission can not change the employee's theory of
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recovery, even within the same cause of action for industrial accident.10 But Smith's
argument went even further: it sought to change the cause of action; not just the theory of
recovery under the same cause of action. If the Commission had no authority to change a
theory of recovery under the same cause of action, then the Commission could not
convert Ms. Christensen's cause of action to a different cause of action for occupational
disease. Smith's argument to convert industrial accident claims to occupational disease
claims contradicted well-established legal precedent, and should be rejected.
This Court should deny Smith's appeal because there was no basis to convert Ms.
Christensen's industrial accident claim into an occupational disease. Courts can not
change plaintiffs theory of recovery, let alone a cause of action. Ms. Christensen chose
her remedy, presented her facts, and was awarded compensation and benefits because she
proved her cumulative trauma theory of industrial accident. This Court should affirm the
Commission's award, and deny Smith's appeal.

10

For example, a judge in a products liability case can not change the
plaintiffs theory of recovery from breach of warranty to strict liability, even though they
are both theories of recovery under a products liability claim.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the Commission's order awarding Ms. Christensen's
compensation and benefits for her cervical injury and fusion surgery because it correctly
found that Ms. Christensen was injured by cumulative trauma accident - a theory of
accident that has been recognized for over forty years. This appeal failed to challenge the
dual elements of Ms. Christensen's industrial accident (legal and medical causation), and
should be denied. This Court should affirm the Commission's order, and hold that Ms.
Christensen's repetitive work exertions including lifting tools weighing up to 70 pounds,
during 12 hour shifts over a four month period stated an accident claim because they were
the legal and medical cause of her injuries. This appeal should also be denied because
courts can not convert proven causes of action to different causes of action, and there was
no legal basis for Smith's appeal where Ms. Christensen had proven her accident case.
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the Commission's order, and deny Smith's
appeal.
DATED this 19th day of April, 2010.
KING & BURKE, P.C.

Richard R. Burke
Attorneys for Petitioner
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